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Abstract 
We characterize a country’s exchange rate regime by how its central bank channels a capi-
tal account shock across three variables: exchange depreciation, interest rates, and interna-
tional reserve flows. Structural vector autoregression estimates for Brazil, Mexico, and Tur-
key reveal such responses, both contemporaneously and over time. Capital account shocks 
are further shown to affect output growth and inflation. The nature and magnitude of these 
effects may depend on the exchange rate regime. 
1. Introduction 
“There was huge ambivalence on the part of the staff (regarding policy options for Asian 
countries facing capital outflows) [...] if we jack up interest rates, we will kill off our com-
panies. But, you are dealing with a foreign exchange crisis. So pick your poison. You are 
going to have a terrible problem either way.” 
Karin Lissakers, U.S. Representative to the IMF, quoted in (Blustein, 2001, p. 156, 
emphasis added). 
The choice of exchange rate regime is a perennial issue for policymakers. But, 
in the wake of the recent volatility in global capital markets, this issue has taken on 
special relevance for emerging markets.
1 Recent exchange rate crises have led some 
to conclude that, in an environment of capital market volatility, more exchange rate 
flexibility is desirable.
2
Unfortunately, accepting more exchange rate flexibility can also represent 
a choice among undesirable alternatives: facing an adverse shock, central banks must 
“pick their poison”. Letting the currency depreciate, they have to accept unwanted ef-
fects such as additional price inflation and adverse balance sheet effects on foreign 
currency financial liabilities. Raising the interest rate to defend the exchange rate, on 
the other hand, may adversely affect economic activity, financial sector balance sheets, 
or both. 
An exchange rate regime should ultimately reflect a central bank’s preference 
as to how such a shock should be transmitted to the domestic economy. However, 
1 This paper is primarily positive and empirical. Normative, theoretical papers on the choice of exchange
rate regime are too numerous to mention. Recent theoretical papers that link exchange rate regimes to
volatile external capital markets, domestic output, and inflation include (Lahiri, Végh, 2001) and (Parrado,
Velasco, 2002). 
2 Stanley Fischer  (2001) suggests that since traditional (soft)  pegs are unsustainable in such an envi-
ronment, exchange rate regimes have instead drifted towards the polar extremes of either hard pegs or free
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ascertaining the regime actually chosen by the central bank or how such shocks affect 
the domestic economy can be a difficult task. As is well known, a country’s stated 
exchange rate policy can differ substantially from its actual one, as observed by 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002), and Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004) among others.
3 Moreover, exactly how to measure the exchange 
rate regime – that is, the degree of flexibility – remains an open question, which will 
be discussed in greater detail below. 
This paper examines a country’s choice of exchange rate regimes and their ef-
fect on the economies in emerging markets.
4 First, we empirically characterize a coun-
try’s exchange rate regime as a dynamic response to external capital account shocks
5
– how countries “pick their poison”. Second, we analyze the impact of capital market 
shocks on the domestic economy when it chooses a particular response – the outcome 
of the “poison”. Specifically, we assess the effect of such shocks on two key domes-
tic variables: real economic growth and inflation, conditional on an exchange rate 
regime chosen by the central bank. In this way, we can evaluate how – if at all – 
the choice of exchange rate regime affects the outcome of external shocks to the do-
mestic economy.
6
More specifically, our model casts this policy decision in two dimensions. In 
one dimension, the central bank decides whether to adjust monetary aggregates (re-
serves, with corresponding domestic credit flows) or prices (exchange rates, interest 
rates), or some combination thereof. In the other dimension, the central bank decides 
which of the prices to adjust: interest rates, exchange rates, or some combination 
thereof. When central banks aim to shield domestic economies from such shocks, 
they typically do so by limiting both exchange rate and interest rate flexibility. As 
a result, the shock is partly absorbed by international reserve flows, which may in 
turn be offset to some degree by domestic credit creation through sterilized inter-
vention. Such a policy may be unsustainable, but interest rate and exchange rate fle-
xibility may also be undesirable. 
We use a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) framework. Doing so per-
mits us to analyze how a single shock might be channeled into several variables. We 
examine impulse response functions (IRFs) of capital market shocks on these do-
mestic variables across different time periods and exchange rate regimes. We also 
investigate simulated IRFs based on counterfactual exchange rate regime assump-
tions. 
The results in this paper help illustrate a variety of exchange rate/monetary 
regimes. At one extreme, in Mexico, prior to its crisis of late 1994, external shocks 
were nearly completely reflected in reserve flows. By contrast, in Turkey, from mid- 
3 The standard reference on nominal or declared exchange rate regimes is the International Monetary
Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. As a point of comparison,
these authors develop several measures of effective exchange rate policy. 
4 They are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey, which have recently faced several kinds of external shocks, in-
cluding those to the capital account. 
5 Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) examine the impact of reserve shocks on domestic variables. 
6 Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) propose to gauge exchange rate policy by examining exchange rate
volatility, both unconditionally and relative to the sum of the variances of exchange rates and reserves (a bi-
variate measure of exchange market pressure). Unfortunately, such indices ignore the essential nature of
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-1994 through 2001 (just before an exchange rate crisis) the central bank responded 
to external shocks primarily with interest rate movements. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the SVAR model 
and its identifying restrictions are developed. Section III presents the empirical results, 
including effects of capital market shocks on the domestic economy. Section IV pre-
sents the simulation analysis mentioned above. Section V provides a summary and con-
clusions. 
2. A Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) Approach 
Central banks in emerging market (EM) economies face several factors that 
distinguish them from industrialized countries. First, emerging market economies are 
typically subject to substantial external shocks. Such shocks may reflect business 
cycles and monetary policy in industrialized countries, perceived investor risk, exchan-
ge rate risk, and market contagion.
7 Second, emerging market assets are poor substitu-
tes with, and generally riskier than, those from industrialized countries. Third, emerg-
ing market central banks intervene in foreign exchange markets to much larger a degree 
than in most industrialized countries. In this context, the central bank is assumed to 
channels external capital account shocks into three variables, namely international re-
serve, interest rate, and exchange rate adjustment. 
This section lays out a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model of cent-
ral bank’s behavior in an emerging market economy. In Section 2.1, the basic SVAR 
model is developed. Section 2.2 presents the identifying assumptions. Section 2.3 
provides a detailed discussion about the central bank’s response to external capital 
account shocks. 
2.l The Basic Model 
Consider a vector of observed variables X.
8 We partition this vector into two 
subvectors: X
n and X
m. The vector X
n contains broader macroeconomic (“non-mo-
netary”) variables: output growth (Y), inflation (P), and the fiscal deficit (scaled by 
the monetary base) (F).
9 The vector X
m represents a set of “monetary” and financial 
variables, including changes in net foreign reserves (N) and domestic credit (D),
10
the interest rate (R) and nominal exchange depreciation (E). The model also includes 
the terms of trade (T ) and the dollar (London interbank) interest rate (R*) as the exo-
genous variables on the right hand side.
11 The reduced form system is: 
                       Xt= c0 + C1Xt – 1 +…+ CpXt – p+ C0
*Zt +…+ Cq
*Zt – q+ ut                             (1)
where Xt = [Xt
n’, Xt
m’]’,  Xt
n = [Yt, Pt, Ft]’, Xt
m= [Nt, Dt, Rt, Et]’, Zt = [Tt, Rt
*]’, c0 is 
7 Several authors, including Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) and Fernandez-Arias (1996), suggest
that capital flows to and from less industrialized countries are primarily due to exogenous (or “push”)
factors. 
8 The construction of all variables is detailed in the Appendix.
9 Scaling the deficit in this way reflects the fact that base money is often the residual financing source for
an emerging market government. Note also that the primary (noninterest) deficit is used.  
10 Net foreign reserves and domestic credit are both scaled by base money so that their sum is equal to 
the growth rate of monetary base, consistent with the traditional monetary approach to the balance of pay-
ments. Also, such a scaling has an intuitive interpretation vis-à-vis fiscal policy, insofar as the base money 
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a vector of constants, Ci are matrices of the coefficients on the lagged endogenous 
variables  
Xt – i (i = 1, 2,}, p), Cj
* is a matrix of the coefficients on the current as well as 
lagged exogenous variables Zt – j (j = 0, 1,}, q), and ut is a vector of the one-step- 
-ahead forecast errors. The reduced form errors ut are related to the structural shocks 
et according to: 
                                                            ut = Bet                                                          (2a) 
where E(et) = 0 and Cov(et) = D, which is diagonal. The structural model is given by 
                      AXt= a0 + A1Xt – 1 +…+ ApXt – p+ A0
*Zt +…+ Aq
*Zt – q+ et                (2b) 
where A = B
-1. There are seven structural shocks: the aggregate supply shock (eAS),
the aggregate demand shock (eAD), the fiscal shock (eF), the external (capital account) 
shock  (eN),  the money  supply  shock  (eMS),  the money  demand  shock  (eMD),  and 
the exchange rate shock (eE). We conformably partition ut and et into the non-mone-
tary and monetary components: 
ut = [u
nǯ, u




n = [uYt, uPt, uFt]’,  
ut
m = [uNt, uDt, uRt, uEt]’, et
n = [eASt, eADt, eFt]’, and et
n = [eNt, eMSt, eMDt, eEt]’ 
Similarly, B may be partitioned as: 








          (3)
2.2 Identification 
The identification scheme rests on five key assumptions.
12 First, output growth, 
inflation, and the fiscal deficit are assumed to respond to the monetary and financial 
shocks (eN, eMS, eMD, eE) with a delay. Thus, B
nm = 0. Second, output growth does not 
respond to either the aggregate demand shock or the fiscal shock contemporaneously. 
Likewise, inflation does not respond to the fiscal shock contemporaneously. Jointly, 
these assumptions imply that matrix B
nn is lower triangular. The lagged responses im-
plied by the first two assumptions plausibly reflect delays in the production process and 
price rigidities for a monthly dataset. 
Third, the external capital account shock eN has non-zero effects on all vari-
ables in monetary and financial block. Such a shock reflects perceived investment (de-
fault) risk, exchange rate risk, and market contagion.
13 The central bank responds to 
such a shock according to the following cross-equation restrictions: 
11 Terms of trade are available for Brazil and Mexico. For Turkey, the dollar price of petroleum is used.
While this practice follows Kim and Roubini (2000) and others, results may not be strictly comparable
across countries. Note also that we use the industrial production index as a monthly proxy for gross 
domestic product (see Appendix). Such a proxy is imperfect: it captures only a fraction of, and is not
always closely correlated with, overall output. Also, to test for industrial country business cycle effects, 
the regressions were also run with a monthly index of production from industrialized countries. The re-
sults (not reported here) were almost identical to those presented in this paper. 
12 The restrictions presented in this section ensure that the model is just identified. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8                                        367

















«» «»  
«» «» 
«» «»
  ¬¼ ¬¼
        (4) 
Fourth, the money demand term eMD reflect exogenous shocks in domestic 
money holding behavior. These shocks are orthogonal to eN and thus do not enter in 
contemporaneous  reaction  functions  for  either  international  reserves  or  domestic 
credit. In a similar vein, the exchange shock eE reflects idiosyncratic exchange rate 
policy, likewise orthogonal to eN. Accordingly, this shock is also excluded from con-
temporaneous reaction functions for international reserves, domestic credit, or the in-
terest rate. 
Fifth, fiscal shocks are assumed to have no direct contemporaneous effects on 
international reserves. Such shocks will have indirect impacts through the domestic 
credit channel: innovations to the public deficit contemporaneously affect internatio-
nal reserves if only they are financed with domestic money creation. 
The intuition behind these restrictions is fully explained in the next section. 
The above assumptions together with their appropriate normalizations imply that 
the matrix B is: 
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B         (5) 
Thus coefficients in B matrix are estimated subject to both the cross-equation 
restrictions in (4) and the zero-restrictions in (5). 
2.3 How Does the Central Bank Channel an External Capital Market Shock (eN)?
Our modeling strategy rests on two key ideas. First, the shock eN summarizes 
all external capital market shocks to which the central bank must react. Second, the cen-
tral bank faces a constraint: the entirety of such a shock must be channeled into three 
13 Note that the shock term eN resembles in some ways several commonly-used indices of exchange 
market pressure (EMP) that are based on seminal work by Girton and Roper (1977) (see also (Eichen-
green, Rose, Wyplosz, 1996), (Sachs, Tornell, Velasco, 1996), and (Tanner, 2000)). Both eN and EMP 
are weighted averages of reserve movements, interest differentials, and exchange rate depreciation. 
Another widely used measure of external pressures faced by a country is the emerging market bond 
index (EMBI). Our measure has several advantages over the EMBI, however. First, EMBI is a spread 
between two dollar-denominated interest rates. Therefore, unlike our measure, the EMBI reflects coun-
try risk but not exchange risk per se. Second, unlike the EMBI, our measure directly reflects the ba-
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variables: international reserves, interest rates, and exchange rates.
14 Thus, the central 
bank’s constrained choice is characterized by two parameters introduced above, 
Ȝ andE. Restating the cross-equation restrictions in equation (4), we have: bNN = O,
bRN = –(1 – O)E, bEN = –(1 – O)(1 – E). As discussed below, these parameters can be 
estimated directly with standard non-linear techniques.
15
The first parameter, Oreflects the central bank’s decision to adjust monetary 
aggregates (reserves and domestic credit) versus prices (interest rates and/or ex-
change rates). If O= 1, the adjustment takes place entirely through quantities (fixed 
interest rates and exchange rates). By contrast, if O = 0, the adjustment takes place 
entirely through prices. For intermediate cases 0 < O< 1, the adjustment occurs in 
some combination. 
The second parameter, E, measures how adjustment of prices is divided be-
tween interest rates and exchange depreciation. If E = 1, the exchange rate is fixed 
and the entire adjustment falls on the interest rate; if E = 0, the authority is targeting 
the interest rate and instead the exchange rate bears the entire adjustment (assuming 
O does not equal unity). For intermediate cases, 0 < E < 1, the adjustment occurs in 
some combination. 
Note that these parameters can be combined to form a single indicator of exchan-
ge rate flexibility: the product (1 – O)*(1 – E) tells us what percent of a capital market 
shock is reflected in exchange rate movements. For example, if (1 – O)*(1 – E) = 1, 
the exchange rate is freely floating in the sense that 100 percent of a capital account 
shock is reflected in exchange rate movements.  
As a continuous indicator, this one provides more nuanced information than 
discrete categorizations (for example, (Reinhart, Rogoff, 2004)). Also, unlike Levy- 
-Yeyati and Sturznegger (2005), this indicator incorporates both net purchases of re-
serves and interest rate intervention.   
Note also that sterilized intervention can be identified in the model. The co-
efficient bDN is composed of two parameters, OD. This parameter may be thought of 
as a sterilization or offset coefficient.
16 If O= 1 and D = 1, domestic credit flows fully 
offset or sterilize reserve flows. 
3. Empirical Results: Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey 
This section presents empirical results of the model for three emerging market 
countries, namely Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey.
17 These results help address several 
issues. Section 3.1 examines the reactions by each country’s central banks to capital 
account shocks eN, in terms of both the impact multipliers (the elements of B
mm) and 
14 One way to interpret eN is that it includes time-varying, unobservable elements like expected exchange 
depreciation and risk. Here, the shock has been normalized on reserves. While this normalization is ar-
bitrary, it does conform to previous literature, including Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993). Also, in 
the strictest sense, eN may imply some sort of quantity rationing, since capital market shocks are not fully 
contained in the interest rate. 
15 The same result may be obtained by restricting bNN equal to unity (as is more commonly done). In this 
case, the parameters uncovered from linear estimates would be: O = 1 + bRN / E, E = bRN/(bEN + bRN).
16 Older literature, notably (Kouri, Porter, 1974) also attempted to estimate such a parameter. For a more 
recent discussion of this issue, see (Kletzer, Spiegel, 1998).  
17 All estimates are performed with RATS package; SVAR estimates use the CVMODEL procedure. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8                                        369
the dynamic responses (through impulse response functions). Section 3.2 examines 
the impact of capital account shocks on three domestic variables: output growth, in-
flation, and the primary fiscal deficit. 
For each country, the results are presented for selected subperiods that re-
flect distinct and well-known policy regimes.
18 For Mexico, we divide the sample 
period into two subperiods: (i) the low-inflation, managed exchange rate period be-
fore the Tequila crisis (1988:1–1994:10), and (ii) the post-crisis period, including 
the float (1995:1–2000:12). 
Similarly, for Turkey, the two periods are separated by an exchange rate cri-
sis, namely (i) 1987:1–1993:12 period and (ii) 1994:5–2001:1 period. For Brazil, we 
have sufficient data for only one period: the Post-Real managed float/exchange rate 
band era (1994:8–1998:12). All variables are stationary. Results of both unit root tests 
and the reduced form of the VAR system (1) are available upon request. 
3.1 Central Bank Reactions 
Table 1 presents point estimates of the impact multipliers of foreign reserve 
accumulation, interest rate changes, and exchange depreciation for capital account 
shocks eN: the parameters O, Eand D. The last row of Table 1 presents the variance 
ratio statistic given by var(eN)/[var(N) + var (R) + var(E)]. This statistic indicates in-
formally how important are capital account shocks in explaining the total variability 
of the components of exchange market pressure (N, R and E).
19
The dynamic responses of three key variables are summarized by impulse res-
ponses (IRF’s) in Figures 1 through 3, where solid lines indicate the response while 
TABLE 1 Contemporaneous Central Bank Reponses eN
























Central Bank response to eN
Quantities vs. Prices   Ȝ 0,80  1,02  0,78  0,78  0,54 
(0,05)  (0,01)  (0,09)  (0,18)  (0,09) 
Internal Rate vs. Exchange Rate  ȕ 0,90  -0,81  0,55  0,72  0,87 
(0,04)  (1,04)  (0,15)  (0,91)  (0,07) 
Overall Exch. Rat. Flexibility   
(1 – l)*(1 – b) 0,02  - 0,10  - 0,06 
Dom. Credit  Į 1,24  0,17  0,05  0,54  0,54 
(0,19)  (0,38)  (0,53)  (0,32)  (0,11) 
Variance Ratio Statistic: 
var(eN)/[var(N) + var(R) + var(E)] 0,27  0,16  0,20  0,08  0,06 
Note: Boldface indicates estimate is statistically different from zero at 90 percent level or higher. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
18 Mexico, widely studied by other authors (Calvo and Mendoza (1985), Edwards and Savastano (1998),
and Khamis and Leone (2001)) is the reference case and hence discussed first. 
19 An alternative measure var(eN)/var(N + R + E) yielded similar results. 370                                Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8
dotted  lines  indicate  90 percent  probability  bands.
20 Where  appropriate,  axes  use 
common scales. The impact multipliers results confirm that all three countries inter-
vene in exchange markets: in all cases, O is statistically different from zero; the low-
est value is found in Turkey’s late period where O = 0.54. 
According to the variance ratio statistic, var(eN)/[var (N) + var (R) + var (E)], 
across countries and time periods, the shocks eN account for varying proportions of 
FIGURE 1  Mexico: Impulse Responses to eN, Monetarray Variables 
Note: Dotted lines indicate 90 percent confidence bands (1.65times standard error) 
20 A 90percent confidence band is equivalent to ±1.65 times the standard error (see, for example (Kim, 
2003)). Standard errors are calculated in RATS by the Monte Carlo algorithm due to Kloek and van Djik
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the exchange market pressure variables (N, R and E). In Brazil, this statistic indicates 
that eN explains about 27 percent of the total variance; in Mexico’s pre- and post-cri-
sis periods, these figures are about 16 and 20 percent; for Turkey’s early and later pe-
riods, these figures are about 8 and 6 percent, respectively. 
The case where the authorities were least willing to adjust either interest rates 
or exchange rates is Mexico prior to the 1994 crisis. Here, Ȝ is estimated to be 1.02 but 
not statistically different from unity, suggesting that the central bank in Mexico res-
ponded to an adverse shock mostly by sales or purchases of international reserves.
21
However, after the 1994 crisis, Mexico’s policy changed. The estimate of O falls
to 0.78 (statistically different from zero). Thus, relative to  the pre-crisis period, 
the authority was more willing to permit price movements (interest rates, exchange 
rates or both) to adjust in response to an external shock. Note also that E is estimated 
to be 0.55 (significantly different from zero). This suggests that the remaining por-
tion of the shock – that not absorbed by reserve movements – was distributed almost 
equally between interest rate and exchange rate movements. As in the pre-crisis pe-
riod, the IRF for the post-crisis period (Figure 1, right-hand column) reveals a signifi-
cant negative interest rate response at one lag. Note finally that, according to the over-
FIGURE 2  Brazil: Impulse Responses to eN, Monetary Variables 
Note: Dotted lines indicate 90 percent confidence bands (1.65times standard error) 
21 However, the IRF reveals a small but statistically significant negative reaction of the interest rate at
the first lag. 372                                Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8
all indicator of exchange rate flexibility (1 – O)*(1 – E), the exchange rate absorbed 
0 percent of  a capital  account  shock  prior to  the 1994  crisis  but  about  10 percent 
afterwards. These results confirm Edwards and Savastano’s (1998) conclusion that 
the Mexican central bank managed exchange rates, both before and after the 1994 
crisis.
For Brazil’s managed float period, the authorities were slightly more willing 
to permit price adjustments than in post-crisis Mexico (O = 0.80, statistically different 
from zero). At the same time, the authorities appear to be more willing to use the inte-
rest  rate  than  in  Mexico:  the parameter  E i s  estimated  to  be  0.90  (statistically 
different from zero). The IRFs in Figure 2 also reveal a statistically significant nega-
tive response of interest rate changes at one lag. According to the overall indicator of 
FIGURE 3  Turkey: Impulse Responses to eN, Monetary Variables 
Note: Dotted lines indicate 90 percent confidence bands (1.65times standard error) Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8                                        373
exchange rate flexibility (1 – O)*(1 – E), the exchange rate absorbed about 2 percent 
of a capital account shock.   
In  Turkey,  as  in  Mexico,  there  is  a striking  contrast  in  central  bank  policy 
between the early and later periods. In the early period, the authority seemed less 
willing to permit immediate price adjustments (O= 0.93, significant) than in the later 
(O= 0.54, significant). However, according to the IRF in Figure 3, there is a negative 
response at the first lag during the earlier period, but no response (contemporaneous or 
lagged) during the later period. Note also that the authority relies less on interest rate 
adjustments in the earlier period (E = 0.72, not significant) than in the latter (E = 0.87, 
significant). And, the IRF’s also reveal a negative impact on interest rate changes at one 
lag for the later period. Note finally that, according to the overall indicator of exchange 
rate flexibility (1 – O)*(1 – E), the exchange rate absorbed about 6 percent of a capital 
account shock in both periods (although E is significant only in the latter).  
3.2 The Transmission of Capital Account Shocks eN to the Domestic Economy 
One reason why authorities choose a particular exchange rate regime is that 
they wish to shield the domestic economy from external shocks, especially capital ac-
count shocks (eN).
Accordingly, we now investigate how capital account shocks (eN) are trans-
mitted to key domestic variables: the growth of economic activity (Y) and inflation (P)
by examining the impulse response functions.
22
The outcome should depend on the exchange rate regime. For example, if 
the central bank reduces exchange rate flexibility by raising E (permitting more in-
terest rate flexibility), the IRF should reveal larger impacts of eN on output, through 
the interest rate channel. Likewise, if E rises, the IRF should also reveal a smaller 
impact of eN on inflation, through the exchange rate pass-through channel.  
Figures 4 and 5 present the responses of Y and P to capital account shocks eN
for Mexico and Turkey, respectively.
23 Evidence presented below suggests capital 
account shocks often have significant impacts on the domestic economy. 
Consider first the effects of eN on output growth (Y) in Mexico (Figure 4, first 
row). In the pre-crisis period, there is no statistically significant impact of eN on Y.
By contrast, there is statistically significant impact of eN on Y – with a three month 
lag – in the post-crisis period.  
These findings support the idea that the exchange rate regime affects the trans-
mission of capital market shocks to the domestic economy. The central bank did not 
permit interest rates to respond to capital account shocks in the  pre-crisis period, but 
did so in the post-crisis period. Thus, stabilizing the exchange rate through interest 
rate movements (as happened in the post-crisis period) may have made output growth 
more positively related to capital account shocks and more volatile than it otherwise 
would have been. However, such an explanation must be viewed cautiously. An al-
ternative explanation, that the structure of the economy might have changed, should 
not be immediately discarded.  
22 In an earlier version of this paper (available upon request) we also examine the effect of eN shocks on 
the primary fiscal balance (F).
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Next note the effects of eN on inflation in Mexico (Figure 4, second row). In 
the pre-crisis period, when exchange rates were tightly pegged, shocks to eN had a po-
sitive impact on inflation. By contrast, under a fixed exchange rate system (or a band) 
capital inflows (eN > 0) are generally associated with an appreciation of the real ex-
change rate. 
These empirical results are also broadly consistent with the general presump-
tion of how the exchange rate regime affects the transmission of capital market shocks 
to the domestic economy. In the pre-crisis, fixed exchange rate period, the appreci-
ation takes place through (the nontradable component of) domestic inflation. How-
ever, in the post-crisis period, when exchange rates were more flexible, the real ap-
preciation instead took place through a nominal appreciation. This reduces inflation 
through the tradable goods component.  
We now turn to responses for Turkey, which are presented in Figure 5. As in 
Mexico, behavior of output growth (Y, Figure 5, first row) differs across exchange rate 
regimes. In the early period, when eN is primarily channeled by the central bank to re-
serve flows (highO,E not significant), eN also impacts output positively and signifi-
cantly after four months.
24
FIGURE 4  Mexico: Impulse Responses to eN, Nonmonetary Variables 
Note: Dotted lines indicate 90 percent confidence bands (1.65times standard error) Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8                                        375
Note that in the later period, the positive impact of eN on Y occurs sooner (two 
months later rather than four) and is somewhat greater in magnitude. This finding 
may reflect the more active interest rate policy during this period (lower O; higher, 
significant E).
The second row of Figure 5 shows the responses of inflation (P) to eN shocks. 
Unsurprisingly, inflation mirrors the exchange rate regime. In the early period, there 
is a negative and significant impact of eN on inflation at lag one. This corresponds 
precisely to the impact of eN on exchange depreciation (E) at this same lag mentioned 
in the previous section. By contrast, in the second period, there are no significant im-
pacts of eN on inflation (P) – or for exchange depreciation (E).
4. What if the Exchange Rate Had Been More (or Less) Flexible? 
A Counterfactual Analysis 
In the latter half of the 1990s, the countries included in this paper faced some 
similar considerations in their choice of exchange rate regime. Brazil and Mexico 
both desired to restrain inflation under their relatively young stabilization plans, 
FIGURE 5  Turkey: Impulse Responses to eN, Non-monetary Variables 
Note: Dotted lines indicate 90 percent confidence bands (1.65times standard error) 
24 A possible explanation for this finding might be credit rationing: capital outflows cause tightening in 
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while Turkey was attempting a more dramatic disinflation. At the same time, all coun-
tries sought to limit the adverse effects of global shocks on domestic economic ac-
tivity. Nonetheless, in the aftermaths of exchange rate crises, Mexico and Turkey 
relied less on reserve movements (lower Ȝ) but more on interest rate movements 
(higher ȕ) to manage exchange rates.
25
A counterfactual question naturally arises: how would inflation and output 
have behaved in these countries if the central bank had chosen a different exchange 
rate regime – different values for O and E?
The analysis in the previous section indirectly addresses this question. How-
ever, the question may be more directly addressed by simulating impulse response 
functions  (IRFs)  associated  with  counterfactual  values  for  O a nd  E S u c h  an IRF 
shows by how much the impact of a shock eN on other variables would have changed
had the exchange rate regime (summarized byO and E) been different. Of course, 
an analysis of this nature should be regarded as useful but only suggestive. Market 
participants may change their decision rules – and thus system dynamics – in res-
ponse to changes of O and/or E

For Brazil and Turkey, we simulate a policy of increased exchange rate fle-
xibility by reducing E. For Mexico, we simulate policies of both increasing and de-
creasing exchange rate flexibility by raising and lowering E. Similar experiments 
with O were conducted but not reported here. For Mexico and Turkey, the analysis 
uses data from only the more recent periods.
27
Counterfactual IRFs for output and inflation are presented in Figures 6 and 7,
respectively. Results for output (Figure 6) were mixed. Presumably, in the case of 
an adverse shock (symmetric for positive), a less positive response function would be 
expected when E is reduced. An interest rate hike is the outcome of an adverse shock 
and is presumed to reduce growth. Thus, lower E means a lower interest rate hike and 
an accordingly lower output drop.
28 For Brazil and Turkey (but not Mexico) this re-
sult is observed, but only for later lags, and only after observing a more positive 
response in the initial periods.
29 Thus, these results suggest that more exchange rate 
flexibility (lower E) means more variable output growth in the initial stages, but less 
25 The tests show this relation for Mexico and Turkey. This is also true for Brazil in 1999 and afterwards,
although we did not estimate parameters for this time period due to insufficient data. 
26 That is, this analysis should be regarded only as suggestive since it may be subject to the “Lucas cri-
tique.” 
27 In both Mexico and Turkey, the later periods were ones of relative exchange rate flexibility. However,
for Mexico, the estimated E is about 0.55 (see Table 1). Counterfactual exchange rate regimes are E = 0.3 
(more flexible) and E = 0.7 (less flexible). By contrast, for Turkey, the estimate of E was higher – about 0.9.
The counterfactual exchange rate regimes are E = 0.7 and E= 0.3 (both more flexible). For Brazil, the cen-
tral bank defended the exchange rate within a narrow, moving band, with E estimated to be about 0.9. 
Counterfactual exchange rate regimes of E= 0.7 and E= 0.5 both would be consistent with a widening of
the band. 
28 Note that this interpretation is consistent with the idea that, as exchange rate are more flexible, so are
real wages, thus reducing output variability. 
29 In the case of Brazil (Figure 6, top panel), impacts on output growth for lags 1 and 2 exceed those in
the baseline. But, at later lags, more exchange rate flexibility appears to make output somewhat less va-
riable, relative to the baseline. Likewise, for Turkey (Figure 7, bottom panel), impact on output growth 
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so at later lags. Note that, for Mexico, even as E was raised or lowered dramatically, 
the impact of eN on output growth was largely unchanged. 
The results for inflation (Figure 7) were stronger than those for output, with few 
surprises. As the exchange rate regime became more flexible (lower E), the link between 
eN and inflation became unambiguously stronger and more negative. This occurs after 
the first lag in Brazil and Turkey, but only after the second lag for Mexico. These effects 
indicate additional transmission of exchange rate depreciation to domestic inflation.  
With more flexible exchange rates (lower  E), when any of these countries 
suffers an adverse capital account shock, they will also suffer higher inflation, in all 
FIGURE 6  Simulated Responses of Output Growth (Y) to Schock eN:                      
Estimated Versus Counterfactual Values of ȕ
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periods. However, the costs in terms of output loss are ambiguous: the country suf-
fers somewhat lower output loss in the initial periods, but not necessarily in subse-
quent periods. 
The  results  in  this  section  therefore  strongly  suggest  that,  if t ransmitted 
through the exchange rate, capital account shocks affect inflation. This is often called 
exchange rate “pass-through”. If such shocks are instead transmitted to interest rates, 
such pass-through is substantially reduced. 
FIGURE 7  Simulated Responses of Inflation (P) to Schock eN:
Estimated Versus Counterfactual Values of ȕ
Source: author´s own estimates Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8                                        379
5. Summary and Conclusions  
This paper examined the choice of an exchange rate regime and its effects on 
growth and inflation in three emerging market economies, namely Brazil, Mexico, 
and Turkey. Using a structural vector autoregression approach, we empirically cha-
racterized a country’s exchange rate regime as a dynamic response to capital account 
shocks – how these countries “pick their poison.” We then analyzed the “poison” it-
self, namely the effect of such shocks on two key domestic variables: real economic 
growth and inflation, conditional on an exchange rate regime chosen by the central 
bank. The paper thus makes two contributions. 
First, the paper illustrated a number of ways that countries may “pick their 
poison”. In pre-1994 crisis Mexico, capital account shocks were entirely reflected in 
reserve flows. After the crisis, the central bank permitted about 78 percent of such 
shocks to be transmitted to reserve flows, 12 percent to interest rates, and 10 percent 
to exchange rates. At the other extreme, in Turkey’s later period, the central bank 
permitted about 54 percent of such shocks to be transmitted to reserve flows, 40 per-
cent to interest rates, and 6 percent to exchange rates. The approach yielded an in-
dicator to gauge a country’s exchange rate regime that has several advantages over 
the extant indices. 
Second, the paper reiterates some policy conclusions regarding the choice of 
exchange rate regime. Results suggested that capital account shocks can have a sub-
stantial impact on inflation and growth. The nature and magnitude of the impact de-
pends on the exchange rate regime. Our results indicate that when capital account 
shocks are channeled into the exchange rate, they substantially affect inflation. If in-
stead such shocks are channeled to the interest rate, such exchange rate pass-through 
effects are substantially mitigated. Doing so may entail a trade-off: interest rate mo-
vements may instead be transmitted to output. However, evidence regarding output 
effects is somewhat less compelling than that for inflation itself.  
Data Construction 
Variables were constructed as follows: 
1. Industrial production growth (Y): monthly percentage change in industrial 
production index. Source: country central banks. 
2. Terms of trade growth (T): Brazil, Mexico, monthly percent change in ratio 
of export prices to import prices. Turkey: monthly percent change in pe-
troleum prices. 
3. Interest rate, first difference (R): Brazil: money market rate (series 60 b.z); 
Mexico: banker’s acceptance rate (series 60 b.z); Turkey: interbank rate (se-
ries 60 b.z); Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics.
4. Monetary base: Source: International Monetary Fund, International Finan-
cial Statistics, Reserve Money (series 14).  
5. Exchange rate, end of period, period average: International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics, reserve money (series ae and rf respec-
tively).  380                                Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8
6. Net foreign reserves (N); change with respect to previous month, divided by 
monetary base of previous month. Level of net foreign assets is from In-
ternational  Monetary  Fund,  International  Financial  Statistics,  (series  11 
minus series 16).  
7. Net domestic credit (D); change with respect to previous month, divided by 
monetary base of previous month. Level of net foreign assets is from In-
ternational  Monetary  Fund,  International  Financial  Statistics,  (series  14 
minus 11 plus series 16).  
8. Fiscal deficit (F): primary deficit scaled by monetary base. Source: country 
central banks. 
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